3 October 2024

On October 3, the consultation on “Concerns related to nuclear deterrence policies” began with briefings from Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)), Beatrice Fihn (Lex International), Patricia Jaworek (The Nuclear Threat Initiative) and, Nick Ritchie (University of York).

Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova reflected that the security and humanitarian narratives are often placed in parallel to one another, where security often takes precedence over humanitarian concerns. However, humanitarian concerns are integral to security. Statements to forums like the TPNW or NPT should reflect this by addressing specific impacts, such as food security.  To maintain dialogue on nuclear deterrence it is important to keep the conversation going by not dismissing it outright, and then to highlight that nuclear deterrence today is riskier, and its failure could have catastrophic consequences globally. Mukhatzhanova went on to suggest it is essential to question how nuclear-armed states comply with international humanitarian law, particularly regarding proportionality and distinction in their doctrines. Current forums, such as the NPT, offer limited space for dialogue, so interactive debates and newer avenues like OEWG disarmament processes could be more productive. Involving defence experts and using platforms like the UN Security Council presidency to hold an open debate and discuss the humanitarian-security nexus would be beneficial, especially with civil society partnerships.

Beatrice Fihn reflected that one of the unique features of nuclear weapons is the set of assumptions that were developed a decade or more after the weapons themselves-  the hypothesis - or unproven theory of nuclear deterrence. To prop up that hypothesis, proponents will often use language that tries to give the concept physical substance- for example some states talk about “exercising their nuclear deterrent”. To make nuclear deterrence theory more than a set of beliefs makes it more difficult to argue against- the goal posts keep shifting. The excessive focus on nuclear deterrence also illustrates how it is the most susceptible to public opinion-  the value is in how people see the weapons- not necessarily the weapons themselves. That means the power can shift on the way the weapons are talked about, resulting in shifted perceptions and their devaluation. If no one believes in nuclear deterrence, how can it work? At the same time, there is a growing risk of nuclear weapons use, exacerbated by policies and practices to prop up deterrence beliefs. TPNW States Parties have an obligation to their citizens to do everything they can to protect them from nuclear weapons use. One way to do this is to assert, frequently and clearly, that it was a choice for states to not have nuclear weapons, and that it is a security advantage for those states. Countries that had nuclear weapons and chose to eliminate them have a powerful story that shows agency and power, it needs to be told, and repeated, in a wider variety of forums, until it pierces the public conscience. 

Patricia Jaworek noted that deterrence relies on the credible threat of catastrophic retaliation, but in today's complex, interconnected world, this theory faces new vulnerabilities. Global research shows that nuclear use could trigger cascading disasters—famine, economic collapse, and social unrest—exposing even the attacking state to harm. This undermines the credibility of deterrence, especially if adversaries believe that fear of nuclear winter or other secondary effects will prevent a nuclear strike in the first place. Nuclear winter research was downplayed by nuclear-armed states, and the lack of further study raises concerns. To move beyond deterrence, credible steps like reducing nuclear capabilities, promoting dialogue, and reframing security are needed. Integrating environmental, economic, and legal perspectives could help shift the discourse, in particular the underexplored question of the disruption of global supply chains of non-nuclear weapons states by the use of nuclear weapons.

Nick Ritchie discussed how states that rely on nuclear deterrence resist engaging with arguments that challenge its legitimacy because it is deeply tied to national security, identity, and stability. Nuclear-armed states often believe they can manage the risks of nuclear violence, while TPNW supporters argue that these risks are unmanageable and unpredictable, citing evidence of accidents and potential nuclear winter. The debate on nuclear deterrence legitimacy is polarised: nuclear-armed states see it as necessary, while others view it as illegitimate and dangerous. A softer approach to delegitimization could involve acknowledging nuclear deterrence as embedded in national identities but still working towards disarmament by emphasising the illegitimacy of nuclear threats and use under international law. Shifting security paradigms, driven by the climate crisis and technological advances like AI and quantum computing, will challenge the relevance of nuclear weapons, which are increasingly seen as outdated and costly. A cooperative global security framework is needed to address these changes, making nuclear disarmament more feasible.

The discussion following the presentations raised food for thought including the idea that deterrence is the public rhetorical structure that allows for compellence. Engaging non-Western perspectives, like those from China, could open new arguments and challenge unitary thinking on deterrence. Defence and military pressure often limits diplomatic flexibility, so messaging should consider military perspectives. Efforts like those of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones to engage in regional security dialogues elevate the importance of non-nuclear weapon states security to the nuclear armed. Engaging different fora, such as the G20, and promoting trust in disarmament talks, especially with countries like India and Pakistan, are essential. As is making the link with the legitimate concerns of emerging technologies on security in a nuclear armed world.  Finally, the importance of raising these security concerns at bilateral meetings, with explicit examples, can help move the discussion forward.

3 September 2024

On 3 September, the consultation on “Concerns related to nuclear deterrence policies”began with briefings from Patricia Lewis (Chatham House, Research Director and Director, International Security Programme); Marianne Hanson (University of Queensland, Associate Professor of International Relations); Benoît Pelopidas (Sciences Po, Paris, Founding director of the Nuclear Knowledges program), and; Alicia Sanders-Zakre (ICAN, Policy and Research Coordinator).

Patricia Lewis focused on the complex dynamics of nuclear deterrence, emphasising that it is fundamentally based on beliefs and perceptions. She highlighted the existential risks posed by nuclear weapons, questioning the effectiveness of deterrence given the catastrophic consequences of even a single nuclear event and its likelihood to escalate. Lewis argued that overconfidence in the validity of assumptions necessary for nuclear deterrence could be misplaced and dangerous. She advocated for challenging the assumptions and biases inherent in deterrence theory, stressing that uncertainty and the inability to fully understand the opponent's perspective undermine the reliability of nuclear deterrence as a security strategy.

Marianne Hanson critically examined the argument that nuclear deterrence has prevented large-scale wars since 1945, suggesting that attributing this to nuclear deterrence is simplistic and ignores other factors like economic interdependence and war-weariness. She argued that nuclear deterrence is often misrepresented as a proven realist approach, while in reality, it is a risky and unproven theory. Hanson drew parallels to other disarmament successes, such as the bans on chemical and biological weapons, to illustrate that eliminating nuclear weapons is not just idealistic but a practical step towards global security. She also stressed the need to publicly challenge the overconfidence, complacency and assumption of infallibility (optimism bias) associated with nuclear deterrence, including through speaking more about close calls- where nuclear use was deliberately considered, or accidentally caused.

Benoît Pelopidas discussed the risks of overconfidence in nuclear deterrence, pointing out that its success is often attributed to luck rather than control. He argued that our understanding of nuclear crises, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, is incomplete and that the reliance on deterrence is inherently risky. Pelopidas highlighted the limitations of risk reduction strategies, noting that they often perpetuate the false belief that all risks can be known and controlled. He called for greater transparency from nuclear-armed states and urged a reassessment of how environmental and technological changes could increase the risks associated with nuclear weapons.

Alicia Sanders-Zakre addressed the challenge of mobilising resources and support for narratives that challenge nuclear deterrence, and that despite this a number of significant efforts have been made. Four key initiatives include: offering small research grants to support critical nuclear scholarship and disseminate findings; fostering connections among researchers; creating opportunities for the next generation of researchers to focus on disarmament rather than deterrence; and amplifying the voices of nuclear survivors to highlight their expertise. Sanders-Zakre also stressed the need to challenge the portrayal of disarmament as utopian and to promote evidence-based arguments for nuclear disarmament as a realistic and necessary approach to global security.

The discussion continued by exploring several key issues, including the response of nuclear-armed states to close calls, the dominance of deterrence theory in international security discourse, and the challenges of promoting disarmament in a world where nuclear deterrence is often seen as the only viable security strategy. Participants questioned the complacency of nuclear-armed states, the need for alternative theories in international relations, and the impact of nuclear policies on democratic governance. There was also discussion on the importance of reframing the debate to emphasise the risks and humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, and the potential for the TPNW to influence international security discourse by providing a credible, evidence-based alternative to nuclear deterrence.

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3 July 2024

On 3 July, the consultation began with briefings from Hans Kristensen (Federation of American Scientists) and Chris King (UN Office of Disarmament Affairs) to discuss issues around risks and new technologies.

Kristensen began by noting there is a significant risk of nuclear weapons use, exacerbated by the conflict in Ukraine. This can be assessed through two perspectives: normal posture and planning and operations and crisis planning and operations. Normal operations have changed with more strategic bomber activities in Europe and the increased visibility of ballistic submarine operations in Europe and Asia. crisis planning and operations have changed with more tactical exercises, Belarussian participation in Russian exercises and signalling has become more and more overt and dramatic. He also noted the change of Chinese military posture, most dramatically with ICBM silo force, and mobile forces, as well as increased operations around Taiwan. The U.S. pledge to defend Taiwan has also increased risk, as have the upgrades of weapons that can affect China, including the W76-2, which has been interpreted in China as a signal that the US is more willing to use nuclear weapons first, sparking a reciprocal change in Chinese crisis planning.

King’s remarks focused on new technologies and capabilities. He noted that risks with technology cannot be seen as separate from the risks posed by geopolitical tensions. It is important to consider that this is not one discrete technology; but rather overlapping changes. Some are already incorporated into weapons technology; some are partially incorporated; and some are nascent and have yet to see - like AI- and without mitigation, these could increase miscalculation, lower barriers to use, or increase risk of unauthorised use. Concerns include compressed decision making, confused decision making, misinformed decision making (as information and communication technologies increase the pace of warfare); ambiguity; new vulnerabilities in command, control and communications, lasers, the abilities of machine learning to spoof; interferences with early warning systems; how enhanced remote sensing could affect tracking of previously shielded technologies like submarines; the use of AI deep fakes and other AI applications that would diminish human control over nuclear weapons, and more. King went on to note the need for a shared understanding of the nexus between nuclear weapons and new technologies across multiplate forums, and how transparency around non-nuclear technologies could reduce risks.

In response to these presentations, the perception that risk could always be managed may be false. That nuclear deterrence relies on the permanent threat of use of nuclear weapons, a constant risk. Risk reduction requires disarmament. Working Papers by OPANAL and the New Agenda Coalition were also referenced in the ways they are looking at risks and new technologies.

The discussion also considered that there is a different logic applied to risk reduction depending on if a state is nuclear armed or not. That nuclear armed states seek risk reduction to foster a more stable nuclear deterrence and do not consider the risks posed by nuclear deterrence itself. It was recalled that risk reduction - addressing nuclear dangers- was a significant part of the mandate of the 2016 Open Ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament, and the outcome document contained useful language on risk reduction measures. It is important also for TPNW states to keep focus on risk reduction as a means of reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons in security policies, because this too is more likely to lead to a conclusion of disarmament.

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6 June 2024

On 6 June the third consultation heard from Moritz Kütt (Scientific Advisory Group and Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg), Sharon Weiner (Carnegie Corporation), Magnus Løvold (Lex International) and Richard Lennane (ICRC).

Kütt presented on transparency in regard to nuclear weapons, including what efforts have already been made in this regard. He noted the work on the Global Fissile Material Report as food for thought on this issue. Kütt also discussed who calls for transparency for example within Treaty obligations, or in national situations in which emergency responders also call for transparency for preparedness scenarios. There are also transparency efforts and studies conducted by institutions and researchers. Finally, Kütt noted the nuclear transparency paradox: Misunderstandings are a common risk that can be mitigated through transparency, while wanting ambiguity to achieve strategic stability.

Weiner, speaking in her personal capacity, noted that there is some transparency on questions that relate to domestic politics, such as cost. However, there is not great transparency in terms of targeting policies and alignment with international humanitarian law. There could be value in asking detailed questions of nuclear armed states for example about how they forsee escalation consequences, or plans to respond to casualties of non-warring parties in third states both for immediate and long-term effects. She challenged assumptions that risks are already known- as there is limited information considering wind, weather, population in third countries, effects on global food supplies, etc.

Løvold noted that TPNW States Parties have a legitimate security interest in increased transparency from nuclear-armed states in order to mitigate the risks they face from nuclear weapons. These can also be considered risk reduction measures, and should be requested in forums including the NPT and UNGA (for example, in the context of Resolution 78/240 (PDF)). Løvold went on to note that deterrence depends on keeping other states and people in general unaware and uninterested in nuclear weapons. He reinforced that there is a great deal of secrecy around nuclear weapons, far more than publicly understood.

Lennane noted the near universalisation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) agreements. He reminded that the use of nuclear weapons on a civil target could not be seen to comply with IHL, and attacks on military targets anywhere near a civil object would not be proportionate no matter how remote. Reiterated the need to get answers to questions from those who have nuclear weapons in their security doctrines to questions about whether those states intent to respect IHL if nuclear weapons were to be used, if plans, analyses or targeting considerations that are in compliance with IHL obligations exist at all for those entities who enable the possibility of nuclear weapons use.

Following presentations, the discussion considered the importance of emphasising the effect of any nuclear weapon use on states that are geographically distant from the detonation site. That transparency does not equal risk reduction, per se, but does contribute to a more informed understanding of the debate. The lack of public information, including for those residing near nuclear sites, is risky for those communities.

The discussion also reinforced the importance of upholding IHL agreements at all times, and that the TPNW preamble considers “that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law".

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5 April 2024

On 5 April the second consultation was convened and began with remarks from Zia Mian (Scientific Advisory Group, Princeton University), Nick Ritchie (University of York) and Astrid Kause (Princeton University). Mian raised the issue of limited data, how previous research did not consider the collapse of natural ecosystems, impacts on insects, changes in the ozone layer, effects on rainfall and to freshwater, and many other areas. He also raised concerns that there is no assessment of human behaviour, psychological and social impacts, trade, nor consideration of supply chains, refugee flows, etc.

Ritchie talked about gaps in academic research, including questions specific to nuclear weapons that consider cascading effects, how societies react to disasters and genocide. Similarly, there is little published on how security notions were considered by states negotiating Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, or the role of luck in preventing nuclear war.

Kause discussed psychological research including assumptions underpinning deterrence and how the foundation of deterrence is rationality, but the conditions of rationality are not met. She also raised the gap in psychological study on psychic numbing in considering nuclear dangers and decision-making and the necessary pre-condition of insensitivity to the impacts of nuclear detonations in order to engage in nuclear deterrence behaviour.

Richard Lennane from the ICRC and Emma Pike from Lex International also presented ideas to the group. Lennane suggested using the Geneva Conventions as a basis for conversation, including with miliary leaders, and specifically asking “what are your plans for safe evacuation and responding to nuclear attack?”. Pike emphasised the importance of conveying that TPNW parties have chosen to eschew nuclear weapons, not out of a lack of technical knowledge, but as a strategic decision that the treaty provided greater security than nuclear weapons would, and that this is a responsible course of action. Pike also noted the need to shift from asking if deterrence is effective to explaining what would happen when deterrence fails- as there is a growing body of evidence as to the catastrophic consequences of that failure.

As the discussion continued some participants raised the point that nuclear deterrence relies on the social interaction between states, it’s about communication and signalling, far more than other military strategy which is about measurable markers of what worked and didn’t. It is empirically unsupported.

Also of note was the need to consider economic security, and the impact of nuclear weapons use anywhere on a State’s ability to import or export goods.

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29 February 2024

The first discussion around security concerns was convened on 29 February 2024, in which Austria presented a plan for discussions around the security concerns, as well as compilation of references to security concerns in the TPNW and outcome documents from Meetings of States Parties.

The group affirmed that many have joined the TPNW because it is in line with their national security plans, and the treaty enhances regional and international security cooperation. Some states reiterated their perspectives that undiminished security for all is only possible through nuclear disarmament. The security dimensions of risk reduction measures, transparency and accountability were also noted as concepts to consider in moving forward.

The group also discussed how to leverage existing research, work with civil society and academia and others as discussions continue.

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