After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a significant number of nuclear weapons remained on the territory of Belarus, as well as in other post-Soviet republics - Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Having become a sovereign state, Belarus faced a difficult choice: to keep nuclear weapons on its territory or to transfer them to Russia and join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a nuclear-weapon-free country.

At that historic moment, Belarus made its choice.

21 years ago, on July 22, 1993, the Republic of Belarus acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Having signed in 1992, together with Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the Lisbon Protocol to the 1991 Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), Belarus committed itself to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and became a full-fledged party to the Treaty until its expiration in December 2009. The Republic of Belarus became the first State to voluntarily renounce the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons remaining after the collapse of the USSR without any preconditions or reservations. The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the country was fully completed in November 1996.

Welcoming Belarus' accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state, the UK, Russia and the US provided Belarus with security guarantees, recording their commitments in the Budapest Memorandum of December 5, 1994.

These guarantees, however, were political rather than legally binding, which was later criticised, especially after the events in Ukraine in 2014 and Russia's annexation of Crimea, and then the active phase of the war in Ukraine starting from February 2022. Belarus was drawn into this war in the role of a ‘hybrid ally’ of Vladimir Putin and thanks to Alexander Lukashenko, who held power by violence and terror during the Belarusan revolution of 2020 with the support of Moscow.

On February 27, 2022, five days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Alexander Lukashenko held a referendum in Belarus to change Belarus' nuclear-free status and amend the Constitution, removing from Article 18 the phrase “The Republic of Belarus aims to make its territory a nuclear-free zone and the state a neutral state”.

Vladimir Putin said in an interview on March 25, 2023 that Russia intended to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. At the same time, information about the completion of the construction of a storage facility for nuclear warheads in Belarus was announced. In 2023, Russia immediately and officially began deploying tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) on the territory of Belarus. The Chinese Foreign Ministry reacted to the Kremlin's plans and opposed the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning expressed ‘great concern’ about the risks of nuclear proliferation in Belarus.

On May 25, 2023, Viktor Khrenin, head of the defence ministry of Lukashenko's regime, and his Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu signed an agreement on the storage of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus, as Khrenin himself, and later Lukashenko, explained, ‘in conditions of non-compliance with the security guarantees given to the Republic of Belarus in the Budapest Memorandum of December 5, 1994.’

On June 13, 2023, Belarus' Alexander Lukashenko said that he himself had asked Vladimir Putin to “return nuclear weapons to Minsk” and that he was ready to use them “without hesitation in case of aggression against Belarus”, which indicates the actual transfer of nuclear weapons to the operational control of Belarus. CIS Secretary General Sergei Lebedev, however, spoke of a ‘double nuclear button’ when the decision to use TNWs would be made by two states.

In an interview with Russian propagandist Olga Skabeeva on Tuesday, June 13, 2023, Alexander Lukashenko also said: “No one has ever fought against a nuclear country, a country possessing nuclear weapons. We received missiles and bombs from Russia. The bomb is three times more powerful than in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It will kill under a million people at once”.

TNWs deployed in Belarus probably include nuclear warheads for Iskander-M missile systems and aerial bombs for Su-25 and Su-30 fighters. These systems can hit targets at a distance of up to 500 kilometres. They can carry special warheads - nuclear warheads with a yield of 5 to 50 kilotons. The second element of Russian nuclear weapons are free-fall nuclear bombs for SU-25 attack aircraft. These are small calibre bombs, their yield is unlikely to exceed 15-20 kilotons, and their combat radius is within 350-360 kilometres.

On June 16, 2023, the Russian side officially confirmed the beginning of the transfer of nuclear warheads to Belarus. Lukashenko said that the weapons are already in the country, although the exact number and location of warheads remain secret. At the same time, Russia has retained full control over the nuclear warheads, even despite their deployment in Belarus, although Vladimir Putin has repeatedly emphasised. This is in line with international practice, according to which nuclear powers do not transfer control over weapons to third countries.

On May 7, 2024, Alexander Lukashenko announced an immediate check of the combat readiness of nuclear assets deployed in Belarus. According to the Ministry of Defence in Minsk, a division of the Iskander operational-tactical ballistic missile system and a squadron of Su-25 aircraft were put on alert. It was reported that ‘the whole range of actions, from planning and preparation to strikes with tactical nuclear weapons’ would be tested. Lukashenko himself said that ‘non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus are weapons of deterrence and defence.’

According to the Community of Railwaymen of Belarus, according to the original Russian-Belarusian plans, the import of TNW components by railway was to be carried out in two stages: in June 2023 and in November 2023. During these phases, a total of 32 wagons with TNW components and their escort were to be delivered. But in addition to that, another 18 different special-purpose and escort wagons were additionally planned and delivered to Belarus.

For example, some parts, components and equipment related to this type of weapon were delivered to the Prudok station(Vitebsk branch of BZhD) to military unit 94017 (2631 I aviation base of missile armament and ammunition) under the first delivery phase as early as June 2023. As we can see, Prudok is the place where nuclear weapons are delivered to the territory of Belarus, from where they will be further redistributed to storage sites in the territories of special military units, depending on their type.

In addition to the initial delivery and redistribution of nuclear warheads, Prudok station and Troop 94017 (2631 I Missile and Munitions Air Base) serve as a training base for unloading/loading, security, and routine maintenance. These facilities have previously been used by the military, together with railway workers, to practice specialised skills in working with specialised equipment. At the same time, secret railway communication points (SRCPs) were trained, one of which is located under the building of the children's health camp in Lettsy (Vitebsk branch of the Belarusian railway).

In addition, Belarus continues the delivery of Iskander-M operational-tactical missile systems. The warhead of the missiles of this complex can be equipped with tactical nuclear charges, among other things.

To maintain maximum secrecy, TNW units are delivered in small groups of 3-6 wagons with a separate locomotive. At the same time, the number and index assigned to such a train at the initial station are changed before it passes the junction points between different railways both on the Russian Railways network and before crossing the Russian-Belarusian border. Thus, when departing from a Russian Railways station, a train with special wagons changes its number and index when crossing the border with the Moscow railway and before arriving at the first freight station on the territory of Belarus. At each such change of number and index, the train's station of departure (destination) is also changed.

There were other shipments of TNW components. From September 15 to 24, 2023, during which time a total of 26 wagons, both loaded directly with TNW components and intended for the transportation of personnel, escort and cover wagons, were transported from the stations of Russian Railways Cheboksary (Gorkovskaya Railway) and Potanino (South Ural Railway) to Belarus. The destination station of the wagons was the same Prudok (Vitebsk Branch of the Belarusian railway - NOD-6).

In 2024, Russian arms and ammunition were delivered from Russia to Belarus for about 9 months. One of the destinations was again the same Prudok station (Vitebsk branch of the Belarusian railway - NOD-6), which has a branch to the access roads of military unit 94017 of the RB MoD (2631st air base for storage of missile weapons and ammunition).

According to railway officials, In June-August 2024, a total of 49 wagons were delivered by railway to the above-mentioned aviation arsenal, of which 6 covered wagons were intended for the passage of persons accompanying the cargo, and, respectively, 5 covered wagons and 38 gondola cars, the cargo of which corresponded to the 1st class of danger - explosive materials. The estimated weight of the delivered cargo (missile weapons) is about 1,100 tonnes.The community of railway workers of Belarus believes that all this cargo is somehow connected with Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.

In addition, the Belarusian railway is carrying out so-called ‘personnel purges’. Any suspicion of disloyalty to the current regime will result in the immediate dismissal of any railway worker, regardless of his or her value. Even those railway workers who signed in favour of nominating candidates alternative to Lukashenko were dismissed.

In the end, it can be said that the Belarusian railway has carried out almost all preparatory work aimed at ensuring the safety and secrecy of the transport of tactical nuclear weapons from Russia to Belarus.

Conclusion

The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus has heightened military tensions in the region and increases the risks of military escalation. For Belarus, this decision has brought more threats than benefits: the country has found itself in the position of a ‘hostage’ of Russia's nuclear strategy, which undermines its independence and security. To Belarus, nuclear weapons do not offer security - they serve as tools of Russian coercion, perpetuating intimidation and reinforcing colonial hierarchies rather than fostering stability. The only way to ensure sovereignty, security, and a commitment to peace is for Belarus to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This treaty provides a clear and unequivocal prohibition of the transfer, storage, or stationing of nuclear weapons and would break us free from cycles of domination and threats, and would build a foundation for Belarus re-entering the international stage as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Olga Karach is a Belarusian Human Rights Defender and Head of the Human Rights Advocacy Organisation Open House.