The Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Eleventh Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference concluded in Geneva without an outcome agreed to by all states parties, merely adopting the chair's summary as a working paper, dealing a further blow to the NPT Process, as the previous two NPT Review Conferences in 2015 and 2022 failed to agree any progress. ICAN was active in Geneva throughout the two weeks to educate diplomats and the broader civil society community about the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and encourage disarmament progress to meet the urgency of the moment.
Correction 05 August: the previous version of this article stated the meeting had closed without the adoption of the chair's summary, but the summary was adopted as a working paper. This has been corrected in the paragraph above.
The backdrop for this NPT Prepcom is a world where the risk of nuclear weapons use is at an all-time high, with heightened international tensions exacerbated by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the nuclear-arms race is in full swing. The past year has seen an escalation of explicit nuclear threats, the banalisation of strident nuclear rhetoric and show of force, and new nuclear sharing arrangements. Meanwhile the nuclear weapons states in the NPT - China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US - are engaging in a new nuclear arms race, spending $86 billion last year alone on modernising and in some cases expanding their arsenals. Yet throughout the meeting, the 5 nuclear weapon states and their allies appeared keen to ignore their own contributions to the current nuclear arms race and heightened risk.
Concerns over nuclear sharing, nuclear threats and deterrence
The risks of nuclear sharing in particular were frequently raised, by states and civil society alike. Kazakhstan, for example, stated that “the sharing of nuclear weapons is a dangerous and outdated practice that brings us closer to war. A number of countries still hold arsenals from other countries. They are far smaller than those once stockpiled, but still enough to cause catastrophic consequences and irreparable damage.”
ICAN’s statement to the NPT also highlighted the global risks, lack of transparency and hypocrisy of this practice: “The practice of nuclear sharing has been allowed to continue for far too long, and now it is spreading. How will the governments currently defending the practice feel when weapons start to appear in countries outside of Europe? There are proposals out there that would spread nuclear weapons around the world- the very antithesis of the treaty we’re here to discuss. Nuclear sharing is unacceptable.”
🧵Happening now! Naomi Zoka from Pax Christi Flanders is addressing the diplomats gathered at the #NPTPrepcom2024 on behalf of ICAN.
— ICAN (@nuclearban) July 23, 2024
Read full statement: https://t.co/yPJFpSaq5e
#NuclearBan pic.twitter.com/SHO0ZBOgdv
The response from nuclear weapons states and their allies was to bristle, deflect responsibility and point at each other. NATO members in particular, relentlessly repeated the fiction that nuclear sharing has always been accepted by NPT states parties, and that it was not until very recently that anyone objected to it, something which was effectively debunked by reviewing historical records, as done by Reaching Critical Will here.
This NPT Prepcom also saw a stronger pushback against the nuclear deterrence doctrine. In a particularly strong statement, the states parties and signatories to the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons raised concerns about “the continued and increasing salience of and emphasis on nuclear weapons in military postures and doctrines.” They also challenged attempts by nuclear-armed states and their allies to justify nuclear deterrence as a legitimate security doctrine: “The perpetuation and implementation of nuclear deterrence in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies not only erode and contradict non-proliferation but also obstruct progress towards nuclear disarmament. These are real challenges to the full and effective implementation of the NPT.”
ICAN’s engagement at the NPT
Despite the lack of progress to agree to actions to advance disarmament within the meeting room, ICAN was well represented, with partners coming from around the world to actively engage in the meeting, with diplomats and civil society to promote progress, as well as organise and speak at many side events.
Suggested points from ICAN’s briefing paper for diplomats were incorporated into government statements and the unadopted summary of the meeting, including recognising the contribution of the TPNW, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and concerns about nuclear sharing.
Among the many activities held in the sidelines of the meeting, ICAN organised several regional briefings, including Central Asia, Africa and Asia-Pacific, with diplomats to provide information about the current context and to encourage their support for progress on disarmament and the TPNW, in addition to bilateral exchanges with governments on the sidelines of the meeting. ICAN also held a small workshop on victim assistance and environmental remediation to discuss how to best integrate civil society engagement into implementation of these obligations of the TPNW.
🧵1/ On the sidelines of #NPTPrepCom, we met with delegations from Central Asia, Africa, and Asia-Pacific to discuss the universalisation of the #NuclearBan Treaty, its links with NWFZs, the links with other social causes, and of course the great role of states in these regions. pic.twitter.com/dnWmIMj0aY
— ICAN (@nuclearban) August 1, 2024
Together with the Arms Control Association, ICAN co-convened a meeting of nuclear disarmament leaders from civil society to share plans and coordinate action. ICAN engaged actively with the TPNW Scientific Advisory Group during the meeting, exchanging on our collaborative work to advance research and network building to support the TPNW.
What is next for the NPT and global efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons?
Much more seriousness is needed ahead of the next review conference to reduce the current nuclear risk, particularly to ensure that states are actually meeting their obligations under the NPT rather than contravening them through a new nuclear arms race.
The unfortunate paralysis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not an excuse for inaction. It is further proof that action must urgently be taken elsewhere.
Throughout the Prepcom, many states raised the contributions of other treaties that form part of the global disarmament architecture, particularly the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons throughout the two weeks. Kiribati underscored that “the TPNW [also] complements the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT regime,” while South Africa emphasised that while the TPNW “does not replace the obligations and commitments that States have already made under the NPT and other instruments [..] it would be essential for this PrepCom to acknowledge that the TPNW is an effective nuclear disarmament measure, contributing to the implementation of Article VI.”
The nuclear armed states and their allies should end their opposition to the TPNW and make efforts to join it without delay, given its complementarity and potential role to help achieve the disarmament efforts required under Article VI, and join the treaty. The third meeting of states parties to the TPNW in New York in March 2025 is a key meeting in the nuclear disarmament calendar in which all states should engage.