

Why Australia should join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Peter Hooton

Australian Centre for Christianity and Culture

Most Christians are not pacifists. We might, perhaps, call them “just war” Christians who believe their inclination to endorse the use of lawfully sanctioned violence—for the “right” ends—to be fully supported by Christian scripture and tradition. Whether this widely held Christian view is in fact Christ-like is a large and much contested subject. While, however, Christians have long used the “just war” tradition as a rationale for going to war (*jus ad bellum*), that same tradition cannot truthfully be said to embrace nuclear weapons as a permissible instrument of war (*jus in bello*). Nuclear weapons (whether “strategic” or “tactical”) fail every test of discrimination and proportionality. As such, they share with chemical and biological weapons the category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and are the only weapons in this category not to have been outlawed by international treaty.¹

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was adopted by a UN negotiating conference on 7 July 2017, is intended to remedy this deficiency. The treaty emphasises the inevitably “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of nuclear war, understands any use of nuclear weapons to be “contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,” and is critical both of “the slow pace of nuclear disarmament” and of the continued reliance by some countries on a nuclear weapons capability. States parties to the treaty undertake “never under any circumstances” to develop, acquire, stockpile, transfer, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Ideally, any state party that has previously possessed nuclear weapons should have got rid of them before the treaty enters into force for it. It must otherwise destroy them “in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-weapon programme.”² The treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017. To date, 70 states

¹ The production, stockpiling, and use of biological and chemical weapons are prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention (1975) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1997). Unlike the CWC, though, the BWC lacks a verification regime, not least because the United States believes effective BWC verification to be impossible.

² The full text of the treaty (A/CONF.229/2017/8) is to be found on the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website.

have signed the treaty and 21 have ratified it. Fifty ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force.

The TPNW is firmly opposed by the “recognised” nuclear weapon states (NWS),³ who have together made clear that they “will not support, sign or ratify” the treaty. NWS reject “any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law” or that it sets “any new standards or norms.” They think the best way to “achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a gradual process that takes into account the international security environment,” and believe the TPNW to be a divisive instrument “which could make further progress on disarmament even more difficult.”⁴

Australia followed the United States in opposing the TPNW process and did not participate in the treaty negotiations. The present government believes the treaty to be impractical (especially in the absence of NWS support) and possibly prejudicial to the integrity of the existing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament framework. It also thinks it incompatible with Australia’s military alliance with the United States, not least because it would in practice be “impossible for Australia to restrict cooperation with the United States to non-nuclear missions . . . without significant repercussions for the Alliance, the nature of ongoing US commitment and Australia’s national security.”⁵

We shall briefly examine these objections in turn.

Implications for existing nuclear disarmament treaties

The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is currently the only multilateral treaty of global scope to incorporate a binding commitment to nuclear disarmament by the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) recognised by the treaty. Article VI of the NPT requires NWS to undertake “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective

³ NWS, as defined by the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There are now an additional four nuclear-armed states outside the NPT (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea). In this paper, the expression “nuclear weapon states” and the abbreviation NWS refers to states that had a declared nuclear weapons capability when the NPT was adopted. The expression “nuclear-armed states” is more inclusive. It incorporates the nine countries that are currently known to possess nuclear weapons.

⁴ “Russia, UK, China, US, France won’t sign Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” TASS, 29 October 2018.

⁵ Response by Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee “Question on Notice No. 11,” 13 July 2018.

international control.”⁶ The language is weak and unconvincing. It betrays a difficult birth. The hopelessly utopian—or cynical—link to “general and complete disarmament” is also unhelpful.

NWS have consistently devoted much more time and effort to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation than they have to disarmament. A report published by the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (CNND) at the Australian National University describes the situation as follows:

While nuclear disarmament continues to be very strongly supported by the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-armed states, it remains for every nuclear-armed state at best an open-ended, incremental process, with broad and indeterminate links to global and regional stability. There is no appetite for a multilateral nuclear disarmament process and no disposition on the part of the NWS to discuss nuclear disarmament timelines. All nine nuclear-armed states have long-term nuclear-weapons system modernisation programs under development and in progress. Based on current arsenals, deployments and force postures, and on planned expansions, upgrades and modernisation, every nuclear-armed state is committed to the indefinite retention of significant nuclear-weapon capability.⁷

The CNND report was published in the run-up to the ninth five-yearly Review Conference of Parties to the NPT in 2015. The conference itself failed to reach agreement on a substantive final declaration following the collapse of efforts to further the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The adoption of a resolution in favour of a process leading to the creation of such a zone played a critical role in reaching agreement on the NPT’s indefinite extension in 1995. Failure to progress this resolution presents one of several challenges to the treaty’s enduring credibility. Another is the widespread belief among non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT that NWS do not take their nuclear disarmament responsibilities seriously. The report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, published more than twenty years ago (in August 1996), still perfectly encapsulates the fragile state of affairs which the NPT both reflects and seeks to contain:

Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be

⁶ <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npptreaty.html>

⁷ Gareth Evans, Tanya Ogilvie-White and Ramesh Thakur, *Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play 2015* (Canberra: Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Australian National University, February 2015), 4.

sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.⁸

The TPNW, for its part, explicitly affirms the need for “full and effective implementation” of the NPT and can hardly be said to undermine something—a multilateral nuclear disarmament process—which simply does not exist. The threat of further nuclear proliferation comes not from the TPNW but from the NPT’s failure to drive nuclear disarmament under Article VI. The anger and frustration to which this gives rise among non-nuclear-weapon states now promises to find a much needed and perfectly legitimate outlet in a new multilateral disarmament instrument. The fact that the TPNW is despised by the nuclear weapon states will obviously impair its effectiveness but will not stop the treaty acquiring normative significance over time. Indeed, the very fact that NWS have come together so forcefully to criticise the new treaty—having failed to reach agreement on a way forward for the old one—shows how reluctant they are to allow the nuclear disarmament debate to morph into progressively less ambiguous forms.

Ninety percent of the world’s nuclear weapons are in Russian and American hands. Without their leadership, there is no practical way out of the nuclear wilderness—and that leadership is currently nowhere to be seen. The United States has instead declared its intention unilaterally to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty unless Russia promptly remedies what Americans believe to be its failure to comply with the treaty’s provisions.⁹ The United States has genuine grounds for concern but, by simply withdrawing from the treaty rather than continuing to press Russia for a constructive response to its claims, risks a dangerous unravelling of nuclear disarmament undertakings. Meanwhile, negotiations on a new bilateral strategic arms reduction agreement to replace the New START Treaty, which expires in 2021, have yet to begin, and may not do so. Both sides are modernising their strategic nuclear forces and the United States has plans “to enhance the flexibility and range of its [own currently limited] tailored deterrence options.”¹⁰ While we may assume that neither Russia (despite bellicose, and quite deliberately unsettling, public reminders of its nuclear capability) nor the United States wants to fight a nuclear war,

⁸ www.ccnr.org/canberra.html

⁹ The INF Treaty requires the destruction of all ground-launched missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5500 kilometres.

¹⁰ Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872877/-1/-1/1/EXECUTIVE.SUMMARY.PDF>, 8.

we have no good reason to believe they will not one day do so, and even less to think that a new nuclear arms race can be avoided.

Implications for Australia's military alliance with the United States

During the Second World War, Australia transferred its long-term dependence in matters of national security from Britain to the United States. The ANZUS Security Treaty is a post-WWII construct¹¹ and has never been invoked in response to a direct threat to Australia. The treaty requires the parties to “consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific” (Article III) and includes an undertaking to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” (Article IV).¹² The ANZUS Treaty makes no reference to nuclear weapons. A recent Harvard Law School paper suggests the assumption that Australia is protected by US nuclear weapons is ours rather than the United States’:

Australia’s dependence on US nuclear weapons is based upon policy statements, rather than a legally binding instrument. . . . Australia first publicly claimed this protection in its 1994 Defence White Paper. . . . More recently, the Australian Department of Defence’s 2016 Defence White Paper stated: “Only the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia.”¹³

The United States does, however, clearly include Asian and Pacific allies in its extended deterrence commitments, not least because it believes this makes them less likely to want nuclear weapons of their own.¹⁴ The question remains though, perhaps most obviously in the Australian case: which possible nuclear threats are we seeking to offset in this way? After all, Australia is most unlikely to find itself at war with Russia or with China *before* the United States itself has entered such a conflict, and our strategic value as a nuclear target would then be essentially a consequence of our role as host to the Australia/US Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap and, at least potentially, to nuclear-weapons-capable US ships and aircraft.¹⁵

¹¹ The ANZUS Treaty entered into force in April 1952, during the Korean War.

¹² australianpolitics.com/1951/09/01/anzus-treaty-text.html. In 1986, the United States suspended its ANZUS Treaty obligations to New Zealand after New Zealand banned all nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships from its ports and waters. US/NZ defence cooperation has resumed in recent years, but the treaty is no longer fully operative in its original tripartite form.

¹³ hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Australia-TPNW-12-12-18-FINAL.pdf

¹⁴ NPR Executive Summary (2018), 4.

¹⁵ The same might be said of North Korea, and of a future nuclear-armed Iran.

As an ally of the United States, Australia is no safer under a real or imagined nuclear umbrella. While, among nuclear weapon states, only China has pledged never to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state, all have said that they would generally only contemplate doing so if they were attacked by such a state “in association or alliance with an NWS.”¹⁶ Joining the TPNW will not change this situation. As a party to the treaty, Australia would no longer be associated with another country’s nuclear weapons. It would, however, still be the military ally of a nuclear weapon state and thus the potential target of a nuclear-armed enemy of the United States. But we could never in any case reasonably expect US nuclear weapons to be used in our defence against conventional forces (including the conventional forces of a nuclear-armed state),¹⁷ while any potential nuclear antagonist would, as we have observed, almost certainly already be at war with the United States—in which case, protecting the Australian people from nuclear attack would not be a US priority.

The TPNW does not prevent a state party from participating in joint military operations with a nuclear-armed state so long as those operations involve only conventional weapons. Thus, while Australia would obviously have to renounce its dependence on US nuclear weapons, it would not have to repudiate its military alliance with the United States. Australia is already a party to disarmament treaties which the United States has declined to join—the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1999), for example, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (2010).

This is not to suggest that signing on to the TPNW presents no challenges to Australia’s military relationship with the United States. Article 1 of the TPNW requires states parties never to “assist, encourage or induce . . . anyone to engage in any activity prohibited” by the treaty or to allow the stationing or deployment of nuclear weapons “in its territory or at any

¹⁶ Evans, Ogilvie-White and Thakur, *Nuclear Weapons: State of Play 2015*, 52. The word “generally” appears here because there are, for some NWS, other exceptions which could justify a nuclear response. The United Kingdom and the United States have said that their “negative security assurances” apply only to countries that comply with their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. They have also indicated that nuclear weapons could be used to deter a future threat posed by non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

¹⁷ Current US nuclear doctrine does seem to envisage the possible deployment of nuclear weapons to deter the use of overwhelming conventional force against an ally, but it is hard to see how this could fail to provoke a nuclear response from the aggressor or a nuclear-armed associate. As Evans et al point out: “The limitations of extended nuclear deterrence are those of nuclear deterrence generally. Washington is acutely conscious that the use of nuclear weapons to defend an ally against a nuclear-armed adversary would risk nuclear retaliation against the United States. It is thus hardly surprising that, while the United States has firm security commitments to countries in North East Asia, these do not include specific commitments to use nuclear weapons in their defence.” Evans, Ogilvie-White and Thakur, *Nuclear Weapons: State of Play 2015*, 51.

place under its jurisdiction or control.”¹⁸ If, therefore, Australia were to sign and ratify the TPNW, the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap could not continue in its present form. The California-based Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability describes Pine Gap as “perhaps the most important United States intelligence facility outside that country.” Its functions include signals intelligence collection, early warning of ballistic missile launches, nuclear-weapons-targeting, support for arms control verification, and the provision of data for US drone attacks.¹⁹ Of these functions, the targeting of nuclear weapons is perhaps not the only one that should cause us concern, but it would seem to be the only one that is unquestionably incompatible with the obligations of a state party to the TPNW. Conventional joint operations with US forces overseas would not be affected; neither would visits to Australian ports and air bases by US navy surface ships and military aircraft. President George H. W. Bush sanctioned the off-loading of non-strategic nuclear weapons from the US fleet in 1991. Off-loading was completed the following year. “[S]ince then, the only US nuclear weapons deployed at sea have been strategic warheads on ballistic missile submarines.”²⁰ Port visits by nuclear-armed submarines would not be consistent with the treaty’s provisions. There is no reason why visiting US aircraft should carry a nuclear payload.

We could expect the United States to respond critically (both publicly and privately) to an Australian decision to join the TPNW. The United States could even choose to make the alliance relationship unworkable in its efforts to bring Australia back into line,²¹ but this should only increase our determination to test the robustness of a relationship which otherwise imposes very little on the United States. The Americans came to our assistance in World War Two when it clearly suited them to do so. The ANZUS Treaty (1952) has never been tested in the defence of Australia. Indeed, it has been invoked only once, by Prime Minister John Howard, after the attack on the Twin Towers in New York in September 2001. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Australia’s post-WWII overseas deployments (Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq, Islamic State) have served US interests directly—on the whole, rather more obviously than our own.

¹⁸ TPNW Article 1 (e) and (g).

¹⁹ <https://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/defence-facilities/pine-gap/>

²⁰ Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Declassified: US nuclear weapons at sea during the Cold War,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* Vol. 72, 2016 – Issue 1. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1124664>.

²¹ See above p. 5 fn. 13 on the New Zealand experience. It must be remembered, though, that New Zealand banned both nuclear-armed *and* nuclear-powered ships from its waters at a time when the United States still deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons at sea.

Australia's sense of insecurity is strange for a nation that has been threatened so little. We seem almost never to challenge the assumption that Australia must have the formal protection of an external power (first Britain, then the United States) whose own security priorities then necessarily become our own. There are important exceptions to this generalisation, of course, but they are not paradigm-changing. At no time though, since WWII, and never before, has Australia's territorial integrity been threatened by a foreign enemy.²² Our intention seems always to have been to help great and powerful friends, and to keep any possible future threat to Australia at a remote distance.

But surely there will be no nuclear war

The report of the Canberra Commission deals summarily with the assumption that nuclear weapons have a stable deterrent function: "The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used—accidentally or by decision—defies credibility."²³ The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), jointly established by Australia and Japan in 2008, reached a very similar conclusion, observing: "That the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has not so far been repeated owes far more to luck than to good policy management."²⁴

We tend to believe that nuclear deterrence must necessarily work in the future because it has worked in the past and seems to be working now—and because the alternative is "unthinkable." But this is nonsense. So long as nuclear weapons exist and have a described place in the defence plans of the states that have them, they present a constant and potentially catastrophic threat to all human beings. The idea that we should have indefinitely at our disposal a class of weapons whose only real utility lies in never having to use them is frankly insane. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 brought us to the very edge of the nuclear abyss. In the end, though, we are as likely to be undone on the whim of some unhinged narcissist or by accident—a flock of geese mistaken for incoming missiles; a weather satellite launch mistaken for a pre-emptive first strike—as we are by anything resembling deep strategic thinking.

And people do think the unthinkable—all the time. Nuclear weapons have been fully integrated into national defence strategies. There are scenarios and plans for their use. And

²² This refers only to Australia's experience as a modern nation state.

²³ www.ccnr.org/canberra.html.

²⁴ Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-chairs, *Eliminating Nuclear Threats—A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers*, 2009, www.icnnd.org/

we can reasonably expect these plans to have a preferred end state that stops short of oblivion—an outcome that would allow human beings to carry on in some fashion, and eventually to “rebuild.” A British MP once observed over dinner in Canberra that “even a limited exchange” of nuclear weapons would take the United States back to the Great Depression and Russia back to the time of the czar. A conservative Australian academic responded: “Ah, we win then!” The reply may well have been “tongue in cheek,” but the underlying assumption was serious. There is life of some kind on the other side of nuclear war, and there might even be a winner.

For the life of the world.

Nuclear weapon states must pay lip-service to their nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT. They would otherwise place the treaty’s—for them much more important—non-proliferation provisions under considerable further strain. After all, if they have no genuine intention of getting rid of their nuclear weapons, why should other states not have them too?

But nuclear disarmament, they say, can’t be rushed. It will always be “a gradual process” and it will always depend for its success on the “right” political/security conditions. This is not a silly argument—disarmament of any kind requires a degree of confidence and trust between states—nor, though, is it a sufficient one. It could have been used (with as much or as little justification) to support the continued, contingent stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, but the international community nonetheless saw fit to ban those weapons because it believed them to be “repugnant to the conscience” of humankind. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons share a single classification. They are all weapons of mass destruction whose sole purpose is to destroy life indiscriminately. We must not let the nuclear-armed states carve out a special niche for nuclear weapons on the understanding that these weapons are somehow different—smarter, safer, more sophisticated—than other WMD. We must not allow them to hide the sheer wickedness of these weapons under a shroud of clever engineering or to persuade us that nuclear disarmament is especially difficult and dangerous because, after all, nuclear weapons can’t be “uninvented.” Biological and chemical weapons were not *uninvented*. They were *banned* because of the horrors involved in their use.

Those who have nuclear weapons clearly find it hard to envisage a world without them. They are, as France’s Nicolas Sarkozy once described them, “quite simply the nation’s life

insurance policy.”²⁵ The United States and Russia argue that nuclear force modernisation, including the development of new delivery systems, is perfectly compatible with a smaller weapons inventory. Smaller nuclear forces must be “state of the art” nuclear forces if they are to continue to serve as credible deterrents. But nuclear force modernisation is just as compatible with the absence of any genuine intention to disarm—as it is also with an expeditious resumption of the nuclear arms race driven by the perceived need to maintain a competitive advantage in capability.

Now it is, of course, true that nuclear disarmament is finally a matter for the nuclear-armed states themselves. It won’t happen without them. But, in the meantime, non-nuclear-weapon states, including Australia, can at least be clear that the status claimed by the nuclear weapon states is nothing to be proud of. It sets them apart in the wrong way. As such, the TPNW should serve as a constant reminder of the fact that some countries still choose to possess a weapon whose use, in any circumstances, would be a crime against the human race.

Joining the TPNW won’t keep Australia safe in a nuclear war. Nothing will. The indefinite possession of nuclear weapons makes their eventual use, whether by accident or design, inevitable. Nuclear deterrence may be claimed to work until the very day it doesn’t, but when that day comes, there will be no shelter to be had under a nuclear umbrella. And, of course, Australia’s close military relationship with the United States greatly increases the chances of a deliberate attack on us in the event of a nuclear exchange involving the United States.

But it is not the purpose of this paper to urge an end to the US alliance. It argues rather for the formal and complete renunciation of an instrument of war on which the United States continues to depend. We have done this already with respect to landmines and cluster munitions—and we are a party, too, to the nuclear-test-ban treaty, which the United States has not ratified.²⁶ Australia can join the TPNW and remain a good friend and ally of the United States. As a party to that treaty, though, we would be obliged to sever all links with nuclear weapons, to speak out clearly for their irreversible abolition everywhere, and to

²⁵ Speech by then President Sarkozy, 21 March 2008, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0803/doc09.htm>.

²⁶ The United States’ most recent Nuclear Posture Review (February 2018) affirms that the United States “will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” and suggests that it would be prepared to resume nuclear explosive testing should this prove “necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.” NPR Executive Summary, 13.

censure those, including friends, who—in this matter—are so often, and so obviously, guilty of obfuscation and duplicity.

A recent paper on “the ethics of nuclear weapons” prepared for the Church of England’s General Synod by the church’s Mission and Public Affairs Council points to a tension in modern Christian ethics between the Christian Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr and the pacifist communitarianism of Stanley Hauerwas and John Milbank. This tension, it says, is reflected in Christian attitudes to nuclear weapons which it characterises as either “realistic” (accommodating) or “prophetic” (unequivocally hostile). The paper finds in the English Roman Catholic theologian Nicholas Lash a third way, another reading which “demands an appropriate engagement with destructive violence” and the “construction of the kind of culture of reconciliation . . . which might embody, sustain and publicly communicate the announcement of God’s peace.”²⁷ While this approach may be helpful in a generic discussion of Christian attitudes to war and violence, it has no place in the nuclear arms debate. The issue here is not war. It is the weapon. There is no reconciling the indiscriminate slaughter of human beings—and nuclear weapons have no other purpose²⁸—with the love of Christ. One doesn’t have to be a Quaker, an Anabaptist, or a Mennonite to understand this. In Australia, a range of faith-based groups, including the National Council of Churches, jointly called on the Australian Government to support negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons ban. They understood “the gift of life that nuclear weapons are designed to destroy.”²⁹ The Roman Catholic Church is less easily ignored. On 20 September 2017—the day the TPNW was opened for signature by the UN Secretary-General in New York—the Holy See became one of the first sovereign entities to sign *and* ratify the treaty.

²⁷ www.churchofengland.org GS2095: “The Ethics of Nuclear Weapons.” The Nicholas Lash quote is from “Not Exactly Politics or Power?” in *Modern Theology*, Vol. 8 No. 4, 353–64.

²⁸ This assertion may be contested by those who find it helpful to distinguish between strategic and tactical (lower yield) nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons, however, are in practice hard to define, and include some with a potential destructive power greater than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

²⁹ www.ican.org/interfaith